OBSERVATIONS

ON

MR. STEDMAN's

HISTORY

OF THE

AMERICAN WAR.

By Lieutenant-general Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

LONDON:

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1794.

BRITISH MUSEUM

IT has been a faſhion with many (owing to what cauſe I will not pretend to ſay) to declare, that in loſing America, we have neither loſt commerce, military character, or conſequence. Tho' I had differed in opinion reſpecting all theſe, I know full well that until this country felt ſome dire misfortune, in conſequence of the loſs of that, I ſhould meet with few advocates for my opinion. Alas! has not that dire misfortune now befallen us? Notwithſtanding the zealous, officer-like, and ſucceſsful exertions of our land and ſea chiefs, and their gallant navies and armies, theſe laſt are reduced by ſickneſs to a debility the more alarming, as it cannot, I fear, diminiſh, but muſt increaſe. Had we poſſeſſed the continent of America, our fleets and armies might have retired to its ports during the hurricanes and ſickly ſeaſon, attended to their ſick, recovered and recruited both navy and army, and returned to the Weſt-Indies with the means of further exertion. Where have we now a healthy ſafe port? Halifax is almoſt as far as Europe; while in the American ports the tri-coloured flag flies triumphant, and ſcarcely a Britiſh ſhip is to be ſeen except as capture. If appearances are ſo unpromiſing now we are ſaid to be in alliance with America, how it will happen, ſhould we unfortunately add them to the number of our enemies, I need not predict. Altho' I had received my Sovereign's fulleſt approbation of my conduct during that American war, as will appear by my correſpondence with His miniſters, contained in my narrative, &c. publiſhed in 1783, and in the following pamphlet, yet, conſidering every

perſon

perſon employed in ſo important a command as accountable at all times for their conduct, I conceive myſelf called upon by a recent publication, which has miſtated material facts, whether from error, or a deſire of courting a late Governor General of India, I will not pretend to determine; but at a time when my ſervices were actually called for, and theſe more than inſinuations may make an impreſſion on the public, it is my duty to refute them; I therefore ſubmit the following obſervations on Mr. Stedman's Hiſtory of the American War, to the candid and impartial public, who will, no doubt, give me credit for my forbearance in not troubling them on ſuch a ſubject until forced into it by an unprovoked attack.

H. C.

BRITISH 17NO85 MUSEUM

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

SIR Henry Clinton finds himſelf obliged to notice ſome inſinuations, and contradict ſome aſſertions in Mr. Stedman's Hiſtory of the American War, lately publiſhed. The affair of Bunker's Hill has been ſtated to the public by the general officer who commanded there: the volunteer ſervices of Sir H. Clinton in that action were amply rewarded by the manner in which Sir W. Howe accepted them.

But there are other parts of the Hiſtory which prove, that Mr. Stedman wanted either attention or candour. He aſſerts, that the army, during the cannonade of the fleet on the 28th of June, 1776, had embarked two or three times in boats, but did not proceed or co-operate with the attack of the navy. Vol. I. page 186, Mr. Stedman ſays as follows; "at twelve o'clock "the light infantry, grenadiers, and the fifteenth regiment embarked in "boats, the floating batteries and armed craft getting under weigh at the "ſame time, to cover the landing on Sulivan's Iſland; ſcarcely, however, "had the detachments proceeded from Long Iſland before they were ordered "to diſembark, and return to their encampment. Early in the morning of "the 29th they were again embarked, and almoſt immediately afterwards

" ordered to diſembark."—The ſhort *fact* is as follows: It had been *finally* ſettled by Commodore Sir P. Parker and General Clinton, that part of the troops (there were boats for) were to have landed *not* on Sulivan's Iſland, as Mr. Stedman ſays, but on the main land, proceeding to it by creeks communicating with it; three of the frigates were to have co-operated with the troops in an intended attack upon Hedrall's Point, where the enemy had a work covering their bridge of communication with Sulivan's Iſland: the three frigates intended for co-operation with the troops, almoſt immediately run aground; in the hope they would ſoon float and proceed, the troops embarked on the 28th, and finding the frigates did not proceed, the troops of courſe diſembarked, the ſame on the 29th, and as the frigates did not proceed, the troops could not. General Clinton did not ſee Sir P. Parker's public letter, *or know that his own had not been publiſhed*, till the November following, when he received a letter from Lord G. Germaine, with his Majeſty's approbation of *his* conduct at Sulivan's Iſland; but as there were certain parts of the Commodore's letter by which it appeared he had not been ſufficiently explicit with reſpect to the conduct of the General and the army, and as the Miniſter had not *judged proper* to publiſh General Clinton's letter, General Clinton ſhall firſt give an extract of Sir P. Parker's letter, and then an extract of his own letter, certain queries he made to Sir P. Parker, and that Gentleman's anſwers.

Extract of Sir P. PARKER's *Letter to* P. STEPHENS *Eſq.*
July 9, 1776.

" THE fort was ſilenced and evacuated for an hour and a half, but the " rebels finding the army could not take poſſeſſion, re-entered the fort.— " Their Lordſhips will ſee plainly by this account, that if the troops could " have operated in the attack, his Majeſty would have been in poſſeſſion of " Sulivan's Iſland."

Extract

Extract of General CLINTON's *Letter to Lord* G. GERMAINE,
Long Island, July 2, 1776.

" IT was about eleven o'clock in the morning of the 28th of June, when " we diſcovered the fleet going to the attack of Sulivan's Iſland; but as they " did not appear, when they brought up, to be within ſuch a diſtance as to " avail themſelves of the fire from their tops, grape-ſhot, or muſquetry, I " was apprehenſive no impreſſion would be made on the fort; I likewiſe " ſaw that the three frigates which the Commodore had deſtined to cut off " the rebel communication with Hedrall's Point, and to favour the attack of " the troops on that battery, were aground ſoon after the leading ſhips had " taken their ſtation."

General Clinton thought it neceſſary to put the following queries to the Commodore, after that gentleman had acknowledged " he had been guilty " of ſome omiſſion, and had not been ſufficiently explicit in *his* public letter " with reſpect to the conduct of the army."

Quere 1ſt *from Gen.* CLINTON *to Sir* P. PARKER.

" DID I not, very early after I had landed on Long Iſland, inform you, " it was diſcovered that there was no ford at low water between Long Iſland " and Sulivan's Iſland; and that I feared the troops could not co-operate in " the manner we at firſt intended they ſhould?"

Sir P. PARKER's *Anſwer to Sir* H. CLINTON.

" YOU certainly made known your difficulties; and in your letter of the " 18th June you ſay, ' there is no ford, and that the Generals concurred

" with

" with you in opinion, that the troops could not take the ſhare in the in-
" tended attack they at firſt expected to do."

Quere 2d *from General* CLINTON *to Sir* P. PARKER.

" DID I not offer two battalions to embark on board the fleet, and Gene-
" ral Vaughan to command them, ſhould you ſee any ſervice in which they
" might be uſeful on your ſide?"

Anſwer.

" SOME converſation paſſed between General Vaughan and myſelf about
" troops, but I did not think it material; and I was ſo extremely ill on my
" bed during the time, that I could not attend to it, and am, therefore,
" obliged to refer you to General Vaughan for the particulars."

Quere 3d *from General* CLINTON *to Sir* P. PARKER.

" DID I not requeſt, that the three frigates might co-operate with the
" troops on their intended attack on the poſt of Hedrall's Point?"

Anſwer.

" THE three frigates, beſides performing the ſervices mentioned in my
" public letter, were intended to co-operate with you."

Quere 4th *from General* CLINTON *to Sir* P. PARKER.

" IF the forts were ſilenced and evacuated for an hour and a half, was
" it the troops that were firſt to take poſſeſſion (as Sir P. Parker's letter may
" ſeem to imply) or the ſailors and marines, which Sir P. Parker informed
" Sir H. Clinton in his letter of the 25th June, *he* had practiſed for that pur-
" poſe, that were firſt to land and take poſſeſſion?"

Anſwer.

Anſwer.

" I certainly did intend, as appears by my letter of 25th June, to have " attempted taking poſſeſſion of the fort with the ſailors and marines firſt, " but I could not have planned the doing of it with about 300 men, with- " out the proſpect of ſpeedy ſupport from you; and I ſaw, ſoon after the at- " tack begun, from a variety of circumſtances, you could take no effectual " ſteps for that purpoſe."

Sir H. Clinton is perſuaded there needs no comment on the above: if he ſhould make any, it would be the two following ſhort ones:

Firſt, Had the frigates been able to proceed to their ſtations, an attempt (poſſibly a ſucceſsful one) might have been made on the port of Hedrall's Point.

Secondly, If Commodore Sir P. Parker had accepted the General's offer of two battalions to embark on board the fleet, he would have had a ſufficient force to take and keep poſſeſſion of the fort on Sulivan's Iſland, *had that fort ever been ſilenced or evacuated.*

Page 22. vol. ii. Mr. Stedman implies, that Sir H. Clinton had been cenſured for encumbering himſelf with ſuch an enormons train of baggage, &c. in his march through Jerſey in June, 1778. Had Mr. Stedman attended to Sir H. Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he would have ſeen the cauſe of his being ſo encumbered; and alſo " of that enormous train not a waggon " or cart was captured by the enemy."

Reſpecting all that gentleman's remarks on the action of Monmouth Court Houſe, Sir H. Clinton ſhall only obſerve, that had Mr. Stedman attended to Sir H. Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, and General Lee's trial, which laſt he ſeems to have read, he would have obſerved, that the two Generals

oppoſed to each other on that day, had deſcribed the ground and detailed the events of the action the ſame. The comment which it is ſaid the late King of Pruſſia made on this was, " that there needed no other proof of their " being both correct."

The fact is, that it would have been ſcarcely poſſible for General Waſhington to have gained any advantage that day (as he had put three defiles between his main army and General Lee's corps) unleſs, as General Lee ſays, " depending on the ungovernable impetuoſity of the Britiſh; their rear " guard, which was all that had been engaged, had paſſed the third defile " and attacked General Waſhington's whole army, which I find, however, " by General Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he ſaw the impropriety " and danger of, and had no idea of doing." 'Tis true, however, that, from Sir H. Clinton's having been obliged to maintain the ground on his ſide the third defile till certain of the light troops (whoſe zeal and ardour had carried them much farther than was intended) had returned, the enemy might have hoped that Sir H. Clinton intended to attempt the paſſage of the third defile.

Mr. Stedman, after giving every merited credit to operations under thoſe reſpectable officers, General Prevoſt and Sir A. Campbell in the Floridas and Carolina, and General Matthews and Sir G. Collier in the Cheſapeak, in a note, page 134, vol. ii. ſays, " The Campaign in the northern parts of " America was ſpent in deſultory operations." Surely that Gentleman might have known, that all thoſe deſultory movements were neceſſary preludes to others more ſolid, which could not be carried into execution for want of promiſed and adequate reinforcement; nor did he know, perhaps, that Admiral Arbuthnot, whom Sir. H. Clinton had been aſſured would ſail in March with the reinforcement, did not ſail till July, or arrive in America till the end of Auguſt; or that the Admiral brought in his fleet a jail fever,

which ſent 6000 men to the hoſpital immediately; or that a ſuperior French fleet, with troops on board, was on the coaſt.

Page 180, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, " that General Lincoln had re " flected on the Britiſh Commanders for their tardineſs in making their ap- " proaches to the ſiege of Charles Town." Surely, it might naturally occur to Mr. Stedman (as it has done to others) that every delay (mortifying and unavoidable as they were) tempted General Lincoln to fortify Charles Town Peninſula, and put the fate of both Carolinas on that of Charles Town.

Mr. Stedman imputes to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the 3d June, 1780 (calling upon all perſons in the then ſtate of the province to declare themſelves) what ſurely cannot be attributed to it.

He ſays, page 200, vol. ii. " One Liſle, who had belonged to a rebel " corps while it was under the command of Neale, and who had been " baniſhed to the iſlands upon the ſea coaſts as a *priſoner* upon parole, avail- " ing himſelf of the Commander in Chief's proclamation of the 3d of June, " took the oath of allegiance, and exchanging his parole for a certificate of " his being a good ſubject; returning to his former abode he obtained a " command under Colonel Floyd, and as ſoon as the battalion of militia was " ſupplied with arms and ammunition, had the treacherous addreſs to carry " it off to Colonel Neale." Is it quite ſo certain that ſuch miſchievous con ſequences can be imputed to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the 3d of June, 1780? Paroles had been given before the province of South Carolina had been ſubdued; but when General Williamſon's ſurrender had put an end to all oppoſition in that province, Sir H. Clinton, not as a Commander in Chief, but as his Majeſty's *ſole* Commiſſioner to his provinces in America, did iſſue the above proclamation; and, perhaps, under all circumſtances, it was at the time it was iſſued both *politic* and *proper*. And if one *Liſle* did exchange his parole for a certificate of his being a good ſubject, &c. &c. this ſurely cannot be imputed to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the 3d June,

1780,

1780, for thoſe who read it will find, that very proclamation forbids and excludes, by deſcription, almoſt by name, Mr. Liſle from holding any commiſſion in his Majeſty's ſervice, and that perſons having been baniſhed to the iſlands marked him ſufficiently for ſuſpicion at leaſt; and ſurely if all this had been attended to, this ſame Liſle would not have obtained a certificate of his being a good ſubject, or have been appointed to any command, and conſequently he would not have had it in his power to have committed the above traitorous act. Mr. Stedman may ſurely find other cauſes for the revolution in the minds of certain people in South Carolina at the time he mentions, even though he ſhould have been convinced, the civil adminiſtration under which the province *then* was had not contributed. The approach of General Gates with an army; the French already arrived, and reinforcements expected; the Spaniſh interference; the Dutch added to Great Britain's enemies; and the armed neutrality; all theſe probably had their effect.

Page 319, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman, in a note, ſays, "Dr. Ramſey, in his "Hiſtory of the Revolution in South Carolina, charges the Britiſh with "ſeizing the property of the Americans, and their Commiſſaries and "Quarter-maſters with taking proviſions and all other things they wanted "for the army, wherever they could find them, and charging them to the "Britiſh government." What Mr. Stedman obſerves is as follows; "That "peculation was carried on in ſome of the departments of the army, and that "many individuals made large fortunes, cannot be denied; but this never "took place to any extent in the ſouthern army, and the writer of this (who "was Commiſſary of the army under Lord Cornwallis) takes the preſent "occaſion of repelling the calumnies of Dr. Ramſey, as far as they may re-"late to himſelf."

Mr. Stedman has in the courſe of this Hiſtory repeatedly implied, as Lord Cornwallis had done before in his examination at the Board of Public Accounts, in February, 1782, that this abuſe, this ſcandalous peculation had exiſted;

exiſted; and Mr. Stedman further implies, that owing to his carrying into execution the orders of Lord Cornwallis, it had been ſtopped. Mr. Stedman points out the great advantage ariſing to the Army and the Public from theſe orders of Lord Cornwallis, as the Commiſſioners of Public Accounts had done before, in their Seventh Report on Expenditures, wherein they aſcribe to the orders of Lord Cornwallis, of the 23d December, 1780, the merit of having ſtruck at abuſes, which, ſay thoſe Gentlemen, *did actually exiſt* when his Lordſhip iſſued thoſe orders. Sir H. Clinton has already, in a Letter to thoſe Gentlemen, written and publiſhed in 1784, (a copy of which was then delivered to Lord Cornwallis) explained this whole buſineſs fully, and proved, *firſt*, that thoſe Gentlemen had made their Seventh Report on *ex parte* information, when they might have had his, and thoſe of certain Officers of the different departments, who had actually announced themſelves to the Board before they delivered in their Seventh Report; that they had not availed themſelves of authentic information and Sir H. Clinton's correſpondence with the Treaſury, both of which had been recommended to them by Mr. Robinſon, and by order of the Lords of the Treaſury; that they had paſſed an implied cenſure on Sir H. Clinton of negligence in the expenditure, and had given a merit to Lord Cornwallis that did not belong to his Lordſhip, but to Sir Henry Clinton: and, finally, that Letter proves, that there would have been no neceſſity for Lord Cornwallis's order of the 23d December, 1780, if his Lordſhip had paid proper attention to thoſe of Sir Henry Clinton of many months prior date, and of which his Lordſhip could not be ignorant, as his Lordſhip was, at the time Sir H. Clinton iſſued theſe orders, in the ſame camp with him. But as Mr. Stedman chuſes again to reſume this ſubject, and to aſcribe the merit of the œconomical ſyſtem to Lord Cornwallis, as Sir H. Clinton's letter to the Commiſſioners of Public Accounts did not (Sir H. Clinton apprehends) circulate ſo generally as Sir H. Clinton hoped and intended

it ſhould, he thinks it neceſſary to anſwer all the above inſinuations and aſſertions, from whatever quarter they may come, in the following manner:

That Sir H. Clinton had iſſued orders of ſimilar effect to thoſe of Lord Cornwallis, of Dec. 23, 1780, as far as reſpects the Commiſſary General's department, and the delivering captured proviſions to the troops *gratis*, and ſaving the Crown rations to the Public in 1776 and 1777, even before he commanded the army: that in July 1779, he appointed Commiſſioners of Captures (totally diſtinct from the Commiſſary General's department) and for the above purpoſes; that it had been reported to Sir H. Clinton, by the Deputy Commiſſary General, that near a million of rations had been ſaved to the Public while he remained in South Carolina, and his orders were attended to; during which time Lord Cornwallis was under his immediate orders, and Mr. Stedman was acting as Deputy Commiſſary of captured forage, by Sir H. Clinton's orders of February 1780. Sir H. Clinton perfectly agrees with Lord Cornwallis, the Commiſſioners of Public Accounts, and Meſſrs. Stedmen and Ramſay, that infamous abuſe and peculation might have exiſted, but takes leave again to aſſert, that he iſſued orders, ſoon after he came to the command, moſt effectually to prevent it; nor could it well have exiſted to the northward, at that time, for to enable Lord Cornwallis to act offenſively, Sir H. Clinton had reduced the army under his immediate orders to a ſtrict defenſive. There needs no other proof when and where this peculation was effectually ſtopped, than the following letter from Mr. Robinſon, written by order of the Lords of the Treaſury, approving Sir H. Clinton's having eſtabliſhed Commiſſaries of Captures *for the purpoſe of ſupplying the army gratis, and ſaving the Crown rations to the Public.*

Copy

Copy of a letter from John Robinſon, Eſq. *late Secretary to the Treaſury, to* Sir H. Clinton, *late Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Army in North America, dated Treaſury Chambers,* 19th December, 1780.

" The Lords of his Majeſty's Treaſury having received information of the " ſteps which were taken by your Excellency to appoint Commiſſaries of " Captures, upon your expedition to South Carolina, for the purpoſe of pre- " ſerving the property of his Majeſty's loyal ſubjects in that country, and " making them ſome recompenſe for their loſſes and damages ſuſtained; and " for the purpoſe of converting to the good of his Majeſty's ſervice, and to " the uſe, convenience, and benefit of the army, all the cattle and moveable " property which might be captured from his Majeſty's enemies; and finding " that Major Hay, one of the gentlemen appointed by your Excellency in " February, 1780, one of the Commiſſioners was in England, on account of " his health, their Lordſhips deſired the favour of his attendance on their " Board, to explain to them all the circumſtances of that commiſſion, and " the nature of the proceedings thereon: and Major Hay having given their " Lordſhips every ſatisfactory information thereon, it appears to their Lord- " ſhips, that this meaſure has been not only of great utility and convenience " to the army and navy, and his Majeſty's loyal ſubjects, but is an act of " juſtice and humanity, and may be hereafter of the greateſt conſequence to " prevent many abuſes, and ſave conſiderable expences; I am, therefore, " commanded by their Lordſhips to acquaint your Excellency, that they " approve entirely not only of your continuing ſuch Commiſſioners in Caro- " lina, but alſo of your eſtabliſhing others of the like nature; and their Lord- " ſhips requeſt that you will acquaint me, for their information, whether any " ſuch plan was adopted in the expeditions in Jerſey, and from head of " Elk to Philadelphia, in 1776 and 1777, or in any other; and whether the " cattle and moveables taken in ſuch expeditions were brought to any account

" for the benefit of the army, or advantage of the public, by ſuch Commiſ-
" ſaries, or any other perſons whatever?

Sir H. Clinton, in anſwer to this letter, could only inform their Lordſhips, he was not in the chief command at that period, and refer the Lords of the Treaſury to the Commiſſary General, Mr. Weier, aſſuring them at the ſame time, " That even before he came to the command, whenever he had been de-
" tached, he had always appointed Commiſſaries of Captures, that the army
" and navy might receive ſuch captured proviſions gratis, and the Crown
" proviſions ſaved to the Public."

Sir H. Clinton now leaves ſuch of the Commiſſioners of Public Accounts as neglected to avail themſelves of the information offered by the Treaſury to Lord Cornwallis, and the Commiſſary of Captures, Mr. Stedman, to make their comments on the above; it will be obvious to the candid Public, that if the above œconomical ſyſtem, ſo much approved by the Lords of His Majeſty's Treaſury, was eſtabliſhed by Sir H. Clinton, in February and May, 1780, and near a million of rations were ſaved to the Public during that period, if there were no ſavings to the Public made between June and December, 1780, *and that ſcandalous abuſe alluded to did actually exiſt at that time*, as Lord Cornwallis implies, and the Commiſſioners of Public Accounts aſſert it did, ſo far from commending his Lordſhip for having ſtopt the abuſe by his order of the 23d December, 1780, they would have blamed him for having, by his inattention to Sir H. Clinton's orders, ſuffered it to exiſt ſo long.

Dr. Ramſay has, it is ſaid alſo, inſinuated, that the plunder taken at the ſiege of Charleſtown was ſo conſiderable, that the Brigadier-Generals, ſerving at that ſiege, ſhared upwards of 5000l. Sir H. Clinton need not ſay, that he did not think it became him, as His Majeſty's Commiſſioner to the Revolted Colonies, to take any ſhare of plunder in *ſuch a war* That there was money ariſing from the ſale of public ſtores, &c. &c. is very certain, and that the navy, ſerving on that expedition, ſhared conſiderably fourteen years ſince: that a ſmall ſum, not exceeding 10,000l. was placed in the hands of agents,

appointed

appointed by the field officers of the army, is equally certain; but it is no leſs certain, that thoſe agents, though they have repeatedly received the Treaſury mandates to pay that money into the Bank, have as conſtantly evaded the order under moſt frivolous pretences; and that the army is now waiting to receive a very ſmall ſhare of plunder taken at a ſiege, and of which the navy divided their *ample* ſhare full fourteen years ſince!!

Page 244, vol. ii. Speaking of the attempt in Jerſey, in June, 1780, Mr. Stedman ſays, "The real object of this expedition was probably againſt the "American magazines at Morris Town; but the oppoſition which the *Com-* "*mander in Chief* met with at Springfield, was an indication that every mile "of his future march through a country naturally difficult, and abounding "with ſtrong paſſes, would be not leſs obſtinately diſputed, and determined "him to abandon the enterprize."

Mr. Stedman ſeems, in this account, to have followed American writers; had he inquired, he would have found Sir H. Clinton did *not* arrive at New York till after this expedition had taken place; that Sir H. Clinton knew nothing of this anticipated movement (which, as he had not the leaſt reaſon to expect it, he had not forbid). If it had not taken place, or could have been ſtopt in time by either of the officers he had ſent to prepare for one, in which he intended to have taken a part with the corps he had purpoſely brought from Charleſtown, ſucceſs of ſome importance might have been the conſequence: as it was, every movement that *did* take place after Sir H. Clinton's return to New York, was merely to retire the corps (which had moved into Jerſey) without affront.

Page 245, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, "When the French armament of "eight ſail of the line and 6000 troops, under Rochambeau and De la Ternay, "arrived at Rhode Iſland, the Britiſh fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot was infe-"rior, and a plan was laid for attacking New York; but the arrival of ſix ſail "of the line from England, which followed cloſe on the track of Chevalier de

 "Ternay,

" Ternay, ſoon gave Admiral Arbuthnot the ſuperiority, and the Britiſh com-
" manders, inſtead of waiting to be attacked, made preparations in their turn
" for acting offenſively againſt the French at Rhode Iſland. Sir H. Clinton
" with the tranſports and troops deſtined for this expedition proceeded to
" Huntingdon Bay, in the Sound, whilſt Admiral Arbuthnot with the ſhips
" of war ſailed round Long Iſland, in order to co-operate by ſea. But, in the
" mean time, General Waſhington, whoſe army had been increaſed by the
" arrival of ſeveral reinforcements, ſuddenly paſſed the North River and ap-
" proached Kingſbridge; ſo unexpected a movement obliged Sir H. Clinton
" to abandon the expedition to Rhode Iſland, and return with the troops for
" the protection of New York."

Perhaps Mr. Stedman aſſigns here the beſt reaſon why the expedition could not take place; but as he proceeds and ſays, " the object of this expedition " was loſt from a circumſtance but too frequent in the hiſtory of this country, " *a diſagreement between the Commanders in Chief of the land and naval ſervice.*" As this is the ſecond inſinuation of this ſort Sir H. Clinton finds himſelf called upon to ſay a few words.

Sir H. Clinton, on receiving *private* information of the expected arrival of a French armament at Rhode Iſland, propoſed to Admiral Arbuthnot (when he ſhould be joined by Admiral Greaves) that the French troops ſhould be met at their landing; for which purpoſe Sir H. Clinton was to have entered and landed in the Seconet Paſſage with 6000 men, covered by ſome frigates; and all that was requeſted of the Admiral was to block with his large ſhips the principal harbour, until any ſucceſs the troops might meet with ſhould induce the fleet to co-operate; but if the expedition ſhould not take place before the French troops ſhould have been landed, and have repaired the works of Newport, and they ſhould alſo have been reinforced, in that caſe Sir H. Clinton had given it as his humble opinion, that the troops could not venture to act, unleſs the fleet would take an *active* part as well as the troops. It ſo happened,

that

that the French armament arrived at Rhode Iſland many days before Admiral Greaves had joined Admiral Arbuthnot, or that this laſt had been informed of their arrival: thus circumſtanced, all were of opinion the troops could not act alone, and the Admiral did not judge it prudent to attempt the great entrance with his fleet, oppoſed by that of the enemy covered by batteries, and thought that of the Narraganſet unſafe for ſhips of draft. Could this attempt have been made *immediately* on the arrival of the French armament, as it would have been unexpected, it might have ſucceeded; but after the enemy had been in poſſeſſion of ſuch a place as Newport, and the Harbour and Iſlands, ſixteen or eighteen days, Sir H. Clinton is free to own, he could have had little hopes (even if the fleet could have co-operated), which Sir Henry is far from ſaying he thinks they could.

Page 317, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, "in the fall of the preceding year, the "loſs of Major Ferguſon's detachment obliged Lord Cornwallis to return "from his Northern expedition, and fall back to Wynneſborough in South "Carolina. Still, however, the *projected* movement into North Carolina "was deemed ſo eſſential, that he only waited for reinforcements to renew it."

In the firſt place, Sir H. Clinton cannot help being of opinion, that the loſs of Colonel Ferguſon was owing, in a great meaſure, to Lord Cornwallis's having detached Colonel Ferguſon with a body of Militia, without any ſupport of regular troops, notwithſtanding his Lordſhip had informed Sir H. Clinton, although that brave and zealous officer, judging of himſelf, had hoped he would make the militia fight without any ſupport of regular troops.

His Lordſhip obſerved, "That ſuch hopes were contrary to the experience "of the army, as well as of Major Ferguſon himſelf." That his Lordſhip ſhould, *after this opinion*, not only ſuffer Colonel Ferguſon to be detached without ſupport, but put ſuch a river as the Catawba between him and Ferguſon, was matter of wonder to Sir H. Clinton and all who knew it.

Mr.

Mr. Stedman ſeems to imply, "that the ſecond movement into North "Carolina was made in conſequence of a ſettled plan approved by Sir "H. Clinton." Sir Henry, when he left Lord Cornwallis in command in South Carolina in June, 1780, left his Lordſhip with the following order: "'Tis not my intention to prevent your Lordſhip acting offenſively in caſe "an opportunity offers *conſiſtent with the ſecurity of Charles Town*, which is "always to be conſidered as a primary object." Lord Cornwallis had therefore Sir H. Clinton's tacit approbation for any move he ſhould judge proper to make *with perfect ſecurity to Charles Town*; and Sir H. Clinton, informed of Lord Cornwallis's intentions of going into North Carolina, had certainly approved. In his letter, however, to Lord Cornwallis, after he heard of the unfortunate affair of Cowpens, it will be ſeen, that if Sir H. Clinton had hopes, thoſe hopes were founded in the opinion Sir Henry had of Lord Cornwallis's knowledge and abilities; but hearing his Lordſhip had loſt all his light troops at Cowpens, convinced what little hopes he could have without them, though Sir H. Clinton certainly did not diſapprove for the above reaſons *then*: if his Lordſhip had informed him before he made the movement (as Sir Henry is perſuaded his Lordſhip will acknowledge it would have been more regular to have done*) "*that the works of* "*Charles Town had been in part thrown down,*" *and that capital (which had been ſo ſtrongly recommended to his particular care)* conſequently *open* and *expoſed*, Sir H. Clinton could not have approved of an operation of ſo much danger to South Carolina and its capital: nor, indeed, is it quite ſo certain that Lord Cornwallis was perfectly conſiſtent when he made his ſecond movement into North Carolina, for it would rather ſeem he made it ſomewhat in contradiction to his own opinion, given not many weeks before through Lord Rawdon, after his Lordſhip had returned from an unſucceſsful attempt to recover North Carolina, in October, 1780. Lord Rawdon wrote to Sir H. Clinton, at Lord Cornwallis's deſire, thus: "The people of North Carolina "had

* Lord Rawdon's Letter to Lord Cornwallis.

" had not given evidence enough either of their numbers or activity to juſ-
" tify the ſtake of South Carolina for the uncertain advantages which might
" attend an immediate junction with them:" and again, " Lord Cornwallis
" foreſees all the difficulties of a defenſive war; but his Lordſhip thinks
" they cannot be weighed againſt the dangers which muſt have attended an
" obſtinate adherence to his former plan of marching into North Carolina."
But notwithſtanding the above opinions of Lord Cornwallis, and after he had loſt his light troops, that he had opened Charles Town, and was *certain* he ſhould leave it in an expoſed ſtate, that he had deſtroyed his waggons, (except a few) and conſequently had not the means of making a *ſolid move*, or of giving the experiment a *fair trial*, he proceeds on this expedition into North Carolina.

Page 348, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, " three days after the action of
" Guilford, Lord Cornwallis began to retire, by eaſy days marches, towards
" Croſſcreeks."

Nobody can give Lord Cornwallis more credit for his zealous exertions at the battle of Guilford Court Houſe than Sir H. Clinton; but, alas! that victory had every conſequence of a defeat.

Page 352, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, " nothing now remained to be done,
" but to proceed with the army to Wilmington."

Perhaps Mr. Stedman does not know that Lord Cornwallis had been *ordered*, and had *promiſed*, in caſe of failure in North Carolina, to fall back on South Carolina, " and ſecure it;" that when at Croſſcreek his Lordſhip was nearer to Campden (where Lord Rawdon was, and where he could be ſupplied with every thing); or, that by falling back from thence on Campden, he ſaved South Carolina, Charles Town, and Campden, as by going to Wilmington he expoſed all three.

Page 353, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman aſſigns reaſons for Lord Cornwallis's *not* going to South Carolina, and *for* his going to Virginia.

That Gentleman could not ſurely be ignorant that Lord Cornwallis could return ſafely into South Carolina. He may alſo have probably heard, that Colonel Balfour, Commandant of Charles Town, had entreated his Lordſhip to return to South Carolina, informed him that nothing elſe could ſave that province or its capital, that he might return by the Waggemaw river, and that in the hope he would, he had ſent gallies, &c. into that river, and had alſo occupied George Town; nor could there be the leaſt doubt, but that by going into South Carolina (even though his Lordſhip had *embarked* and proceeded there) he ſaved that province and its capital; and that, on the contrary, by going into Virginia, he not only diſregarded the orders of the Commander in Chief, as before ſtated, but put the ſouthern provinces, his own corps, and that of General Phillips (which he had called into co-operation) into imminent danger; that by going into Virginia, he was about to break in upon the Commander in Chief's plan of operations for the campaign, to force him into others (he had always declared againſt) in the moſt *inimical* provinces, in the moſt *ſickly* province, at the moſt *ſickly* ſeaſon; in a diſtrict where he could not long ſupply his army; from whence he could not retreat except under moſt diſgraceful ſacrifices; in which he could not remain in ſafety unleſs protected by a ſuperior fleet, or a reſpectable place of arms till ſuch fleet ſhould arrive; and this while there were laying (and had been laying at Charles Town, from the 7th to the 24th of April) and coming to him, *and he knew it*, and that there might be hourly expected diſpatches, orders, and inſtructions of the Commander in Chief, by the firſt line of which he would have read the following words, which *muſt have prevented his going into Virginia*; March 2d, 5th, and 8th, "Your Lordſhip may probably "have heard, that the navy and army in Virginia are blocked up by a "ſuperior French fleet to that under Commodore Symonds;" and he would have ſeen alſo, that General Phillips had *not* been detached into Virginia, as his Lordſhip ſaid he had underſtood from Colonel Balfour to have been

the ſubſtance of the Commander in Chief's diſpatches, but that he waited the event of a naval action hourly expected, before he could venture to ſail for Virginia.

Page 393, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, as Lord Cornwallis had done before, "that Sir H. Clinton had barely recommended his plan of operation to the "Southward or Delaware River;" and continues thus, "neither did his "Lordſhip mean to engage in the expedition to the upper part of the "Cheſapeak Bay, of which he diſapproved, without expreſs orders from the "Commander in Chief, which would exempt him from all reſponſibility, at "leaſt, for the plan of that expedition."

With reſpect to the plan, it has been ſo often and ſo fully detailed in Sir H. Clinton's narrative, and in his obſervations to Lord Cornwallis's reply to it, that Sir Henry thinks it needleſs to ſay any more than that it had been formed upon very general information, been *approved* by his Majeſty's Cabinet early in 1781, and again re-approved in July, 1781, *alas! too late*, for Sir H. Clinton was then *deeply* and dangerouſly engaged in operation forced by Lord Cornwallis, and which, as he before ſtated, Sir Henry had received the King's commands to adopt and ſupport. With reſpect to Sir H. Clinton's having barely recommended *his* plan, it will have been ſeen, that General Phillips (to whom Lord Cornwallis had ſucceeded) had been *ordered* to carry it into execution, and was actually on his march to do ſo when Lord Cornwallis called him back. In ſtrictneſs it will be acknowledged, that Lord Cornwallis thus circumſtanced, was required, when he arrived in Virginia, to obey ſuch orders as he found General Phillips acting under: but on Mr. Stedman's own conſtruction, "*that Sir H. Clinton had barely recommended it,*" was not Sir H. Clinton reſponſible for a plan which, out of delicacy to Lord Cornwallis's high rank, and after the above inſtructions he had received from his Majeſty, he only barely *recommended?*

Page 396, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman implies, as Lord Cornwallis had done before in an official letter, " that his Lordſhip had occupied the naval ſtation " in York River, according to the ſpirit of Sir H. Clinton's order of the " 11th July, 1781." The ſhort fact is, there were two letters of that date, the firſt requiring his Lordſhip to occupy the Peninſula of Williamſberg (which Sir H. Clinton thought he had quitted a little too haſty, and owing to a miſconception of orders) his Lordſhip was by that letter deſired to wait there for further directions as to the poſt he ſhould occupy, to be ſent after Sir Henry had conſulted the Admiral. The ſecond letter was written after that conſultation had taken place; and his Lordſhip was directed in it " to " examine and fortify Old Point Comfort in James River, to cover the naval " ſtation of Hampton Road in that river;" and as an additional ſecurity to Old Point Comfort, his Lordſhip had Sir H. Clinton's conſent to his fortifying York Heights alſo, *ſhould he think that neceſſary.* How this can be conſtrued, either by Lord Cornwallis or Mr. Stedman, into an implied order to remove the naval ſtation from James River to York River, will be difficult to comprehend. Sir H. Clinton, ſo far from conſidering it as according to the ſpirit of his order of the 11th of July, thinks it was in direct diſregard of it. Lord Cornwallis, if he diſapproved of the ſtation he had been directed to take in James River, ſhould (Sir H. Clinton conceives) have reported his objections to Old Point Comfort, in James River, and recommended York River, and waited the Commander in Chief's approbation. Sir H. Clinton is free to acknowledge, however, he did not, nor ſhould he not have diſapproved of the choice his Lordſhip had made in preference in York River, as his Lordſhip, when he made it, aſſured Sir H. Clinton, " that it was the " only naval ſtation in which he could hope to give effectual protection " to ſhips of the line," which was what the Admiral particularly wiſhed for. But had Sir H. Clinton known *then*, what all the world knew afterwards, namely, that all the ſhips his Lordſhip did not ſink, had been burned by the enemy's

enemy's ſhot and ſhells during the ſiege, he ſhould not ſo readily have approved of his Lordſhip's diſobedience.

Page 407, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, "Lord Cornwallis received aſſurances from Sir H. Clinton, bearing date the 6th September, that Sir Henry would join him with 4000 men, who were *then* embarked, as ſoon as the Admiral ſhould be of opinion that he might venture; and that Admiral Digby was on the coaſt with troops on board, and might be daily expected."

The firſt part is certainly the ſubſtance of Sir H. Clinton's letter of 6th September, but the laſt not ſo by any means; for Sir H. Clinton told Lord Cornwallis, "he had heard from Europe, that Admiral Digby might "ſoon be expected on the coaſt," but not a word of troops being on board.

Mr. Stedman ſays alſo, that, conſiſtent with theſe orders and inſtructions, "and the information he had received, his Lordſhip could not venture to "attack La Fayette before his junction with Waſhington."

When Sir H. Clinton wrote the letter of 6th September, he did not know what Lord Cornwallis *did know* when he received it; namely, that the whole French fleet, conſiſting of 37 of the line, and that 24 of them had had an action with the Britiſh fleet of 19, that the French fleet had returned, claiming victory, into Cheſapeak Bay, *and there* joined four ſhips of the line, which they had left there, and Barra's ſquadron of ſeven, from Rhode Iſland. Sir H. Clinton is therefore at a loſs to conceive, how either Lord Cornwallis or Mr. Stedman could ſuppoſe, that his Lordſhip could conſider himſelf as reſtricted from venturing an attempt *to beat an army in detail which he knew was coming to beſiege him*; an operation of ſuch probable ſhort duration, and ſuch great appearance of ſucceſs. Mr. Stedman is not correct either in ſaying, as Lord Cornwallis had done before, that the fleet and troops from New York *would ſail*, to attempt to ſuccour his Lordſhip, about the 5th October.

Mr. Stedman ſays, that " On receipt of Sir H. Clinton's diſpatches on the " 29th, dated the 24th, Lord Cornwallis withdrew his army within the " works of York Town." Mr. Stedman ſpeaks of Lord Cornwallis's quitting the exterior poſition, and retiring to the interior as a matter of courſe. If Mr. Stedman had attended to Lord Cornwallis's letter, of the 22d Auguſt, he would have ſeen (ſpeaking of that exterior poſition) " that his Lordſhip's en- " gineer had been many days making an exact ſurvey of it; that he had pro- " poſed his plan for fortifying it, which his Lordſhip approving, had ordered to " be executed; that it would probably be completed in about ſix weeks, with- " out any great labour to the troops, and that his Lordſhip could *ſpare* 1000 " *men* from every thing but labour:" nor does that Gentleman probably know the opinions certain officers of rank, who had ſeen the ground, gave of it before a Council of War of Admirals and Generals—their opinion was, " That his Lordſhip might defend that poſition twenty-one days, open " trenches, againſt 20,000 men and a proportionable artillery." After all this, it no doubt appeared to Sir H. Clinton ſomewhat extraordinary, that his Lordſhip ſhould quit ſuch works in ſuch a poſition, without a conflict, leaving to the enemy, in General Waſhington's own words, in his letter to Congreſs of October 1. " The enemy, to our aſtoniſhment, have quitted " their exterior poſition, and we are now in poſſeſſion of ground which com- " mands, in a near advance, all the reſt of their works," which works Lord Cornwallis deſcribes himſelf, " as unfiniſhed, enfiladed, and commanded;" nor is it leſs wonderful, that Lord Cornwallis ſhould, after he had repeatedly and preſſingly *invited* Sir H. Clinton to join him in York River, give up the only door by which Sir Henry could enter.

Page 410, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman very juſtly obſerves, that " Lord Corn- " wallis could not venture to make large and frequent ſorties, from the man- " ner and caution with which the enemy made their approaches, and in the " unfiniſhed ſtate of his own works."

Page 394, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, that "Lord Cornwallis had, when "his Lordſhip was reduced to extremity, formed a deſign of forcing his way "through Maryland, &c. to New York." Sir H. Clinton confeſſes he never ſaw the leaſt day-light in this project; but, ſurely, if his Lordſhip had ever had ſuch an intention, he ſhould have made it known to Sir H. Clinton, that *he* might have co-operated; and not, as he *did* repeatedly, tell Sir H. Clinton, "that no diverſion would be of the leaſt uſe to him; that the only way "to ſuccour him was to join him in York River."

Page 394, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, that "Lord Cornwallis had expreſſed "to the Commander in Chief, a willingneſs, if he approved, to return to "Charles Town and reſume the command there." It is very true, that his Lordſhip did offer to return to South Carolina. *If his Lordſhip had never left it, His Majeſty might have remained Sovereign of that great Continent*; but, ſurely, after the opinion Sir H. Clinton had repeatedly given his Lordſhip and the Miniſter, of the fatal conſequences which had already happened, and predicted ſtill others, it was little likely for Sir H. Clinton to conſent to take the whole reſponſibility of ſuch operations on himſelf. Sir Henry therefore directed Lord Cornwallis to occupy a naval ſtation in James River, and left his Lordſhip's force *entire* to ſecure that important ſtation.

Page 397, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſays, "If any doubt exiſted before as to "the point of attack, it was *now* removed. Nothing could any where be "done without a fleet covering; and as the Comte de Graſſe had determined "to enter the Cheſapeak, it was agreed between Waſhington and Rochambeau, that Virginia ſhould be the ſcene, and an attack upon Lord Cornwallis the object of their operations. Letters to this effect were diſpatched "to meet Comte de Graſſe on his paſſage; and, in the mean time, meaſures "were taken to continue Sir H. Clinton in the belief, that New York, and "not York Town in Virginia, was ſtill the object of their enterprize. After "ſeveral movements, and various deceptions to induce this belief, the allied

" army ſuddenly marched acroſs Jerſey to Philadelphia, where it arrived on " the 30th of Auguſt."

Mr. Stedman inſinuates, (as others had done, but had long ceaſed to do) that Sir H. Clinton had been deceived into an idea that New York, and not York Town in Virginia, had been the object of the Allies. It is *now* well known, (and Sir H. Clinton did not conceive any perſon could be ignorant of it) that New York, and not York Town, was the object, even ſo late as when De Graſſe arrived off Cheſapeak from the Weſt Indies; but, on his pilot's refuſing to carry his large ſhips over the Bar of New York, finding alſo that the Britiſh fleet had *not* followed that of France in any proportion, ſeeing the expoſed ſituation of Lord Cornwallis at York Town, it was determined to make his Lordſhip the object of their joint operations. If Sir H. Clinton was deceived, it was by Lord Cornwallis's coming into Virginia, diſregarding Sir H. Clinton's orders, forming operations there, and recommending it to the Miniſter—by the Admirals in the Weſt Indies not bringing or ſending a ſufficient naval force to protect ſuch operations, as they had been repeatedly ordered to do, and by the Cabinet of that day not inforcing His Majeſty's orders to his admirals.

Page 415, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman writes, " Unfortunately, the letter written " by Lord Cornwallis to the Commander in Chief, acquainting him with the " ſurrender of the Ports of York and Glouceſter, and narrating the cauſes " which led to that event, with the motives that influenced his own conduct, " produced a difference between them, which terminated in an appeal to the " Public."

Sir H. Clinton has, and does moſt willingly, leave it to the public to decide; and he truſts that the public have long ſince decided, that " in narrating the " cauſes which led to the cataſtrophe of York Town," which cloſed the unfortunate campaign of 1781, and loſt that great Continent, his Lordſhip has produced as cauſes, what he is not authoriſed to aſſert as facts, ſupported by any

any documents he has or can produce. Without repeating the whole of that letter, Sir H. Clinton will extract only one or two paragraphs:

First, his Lordſhip ſays, "I never ſaw this poſt in any favourable light; "but when I found I was to be attacked in it, in ſo unprepared a ſtate, by ſo "powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the *hopes** of relief would have "induced me to attempt its defence; for I would either have endeavoured to "eſcape to New York by rapid marches from Glouceſter ſide, *immediately* on "the arrival of General Waſhington at Williamſburgh, or I would, notwith-"ſtanding the diſparity of numbers, have attacked them in the open field, "where it might have been juſt poſſible that fortune would have favoured the "gallantry of the handful of troops under my command; but being aſſured "by your Excellency's letters, that every poſſible means would be tried by "navy and army to relieve us, I could not think myſelf at liberty to venture "upon either deſperate attempts; therefore, after remaining two days in a "ſtrong† poſition in the front of this place, *in the hopes of being attacked*, upon "obſerving that the enemy were taking meaſures to turn my left flank in a "ſhort time, and receiving on the ſecond evening your letter of the 24th "September, informing me that relief *would* fail about the 5th October, I "withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th September."

Sir H. Clinton muſt again appeal to the candour of the public to determine, whether, by the above extract, his Lordſhip does not in the ſtrongeſt terms imply, nay aſſert, that he had been prevented attacking the enemy in the field, or eſcaping immediately on the junction of General Waſhington and La Fayette, *by Sir H. Clinton's aſſurances* that the navy and army would do every thing to ſuccour him, and that relief *would* fail about the 5th October? Sir

* Lord Cornwallis could have no hopes till 29th September.

† His Lordſhip's own deſcription of this exterior poſition—"a Gorge between two Creeks "or Ravines, which come from the river on each ſide the town." What Waſhington ſays of this exterior poſition proves its ſituation in other reſpects. How ſuch a poſition could be turned, or how it could be quitted without a ſhot, is for Lord Cornwallis to explain.

H. Clinton is once more under the neceſſity of aſſerting, that Lord Cornwallis did *not* receive any aſſurances of the exertions of the navy, or of the navy's making any attempt to ſuccour him, till the 29th September (all which his Lordſhip has ſince acknowledged) and he conſequently was not prevented from making either of the above attempts, by any aſſurances of ſuccour he had received from Sir H. Clinton, as the junction with Waſhington and La Fayette was made two or three days before Lord Cornwallis received ſuch aſſurances. Nor did Sir H. Clinton, in his letter of the 24th of September, which his Lordſhip received on the 29th, ſay, (as his Lordſhip aſſerts he did) *that relief would fail about the 5th of October*. Sir H. Clinton's words were, "there is every reaſon to hope the *fleet* will ſail." Sir H. Clinton is under the neceſſity of mentioning this alſo, becauſe the Admirals, on reading the above aſſertion of Lord Cornwallis, blamed Sir H. Clinton for having given his Lordſhip too much hopes.

Lord Cornwallis ſays alſo, "Our ſtock of intrenching tools, which did not "much exceed 400 when we began to work in the latter end of Auguſt, "was now much diminiſhed."

Sir H. Clinton can only repeat, that a very great proportion indeed was ſent to Cheſapeak. He is informed that many were returned to New York by his Lordſhip's order; but he muſt declare, that when he called upon the Chief Engineer for *his return of intrenching tools upon the York ſide when the works were begun upon*, by *that* return it appears his Lordſhip had 992.

Now as his Lordſhip and Mr. Stedman both ſay, that his Lordſhip's letter of the 20th October was written to narrate the cauſes which led to the cataſtrophe of York Town, Sir H. Clinton finds himſelf authoriſed to aſſert, that his Lordſhip has produced as cauſes, and aſſerted as facts, what he cannot ſupport as ſuch.

One circumſtance more Sir H. Clinton thinks neceſſary to mention, as it never has been well underſtood. About the month of March, 1782, certain Com-

Commiſſioners appointed by both parties met: whatever was the oſtenſible object of their meeting, it poſſibly anſwered ſome political purpoſes to both Chiefs. Certain Loyaliſts, from what motives I ſhall not attempt to account, were guilty of an act of atrocity, which, under all the circumſtances attending it, is, I think, ſcarcely to be paralleled in hiſtory, and which tended to deſtroy the little confidence there remained between the parties at war, to prevent all future intercourſe, and, in ſhort, ſeems to throw away the ſcabbard. Sir H. Clinton wiſhing to unite every exertion of the Continent, had formed a Board, compoſed of all the principal Refugees, given them powers to aſſemble troops and fleets, gave them veſſels, victualled and armed them, and ſupplied them occaſionally with money; but fearing *their reſentment* againſt the Rebels, (for which there was, no doubt, but too much cauſe) Sir H. Clinton endeavoured to guard againſt its dangerous effects, by limiting their powers in ſome reſpects. The above Board ſent a meſſage to Sir H. Clinton, deſiring leave to take from the King's priſoners, a perſon of the name of Huddy, who had been taken by them; they informed Sir Henry, it was their wiſh to ſend that priſoner to the rebel ſhore, there to offer him in exchange for one of their friends. Sir H. Clinton conſented. They then delivered Huddy over to a perſon of the name of Lippicut, who was a Captain of theirs, and to whom, by their deſire, Sir H. Clinton had given a militia commiſſion. This perſon, and others with him, carried the priſoner Huddy to the rebel ſhore, landed him in Jerſey, and inſtead of offering him in exchange, as they had informed Sir Henry they intended to do, they hanged him, and left him hanging on a tree. This happened while the above-named Congreſs were ſitting not many miles diſtant. The inſtant Sir H. Clinton was informed of the outrage, he ſent to the Board to direct them to inquire and report: their anſwer was, that Captain Lippicut was gone to the races, and on his return he probably would report to them. Offended that this meſſage had been attended with ſo much levity, Sir H. Clinton ordered Captain Lippicut to be ſeized and brought priſoner.

ſoner. He then aſſembled all the ſuperior officers of the navy and army, provincial and foreign, and, at their unanimous requeſt, ordered Lippicut to be tried by a General Court Martial for *murder*. A Court Martial was aſſembled, compoſed as above. After it had ſat three days, Sir H. Clinton received a very improper letter from General Waſhington, threatening to puniſh the innocent, unleſs the guilty were delivered up to him. Sir H. Clinton, in anſwer, rebuked Mr. Waſhington for preſuming to interfere in his command, reminded him of the many atrocious provocations which had been given; informing him, however, what ſteps he had thought proper to take, and that he ſhould be made acquainted with the reſult. The trial continued; General Robinſon, who had at firſt been named to ſucceed Sir H. Clinton, begged his permiſſion to write to General Waſhington, not doubting but he ſhould be able, as he ſaid, to ſoften him. Sir H. Clinton, after predicting the fate of ſuch an application, conſented. Sir Guy Carleton, who was appointed to ſucceed to Sir H. Clinton, arrived before General Waſhington had anſwered General Robinſon's letter. Three days before Sir H. Clinton quitted the command, General Robinſon received General Waſhington's anſwer in moſt inſulting terms, threatening to puniſh the innocent for the guilty; and before Sir H. Clinton left New York, Sir Guy Carleton, who had alſo written to General Waſhington on the ſame ſubject, informed Sir H. Clinton, that though his anſwer was very civil *perſonally* to him, he was, nevertheleſs, determined reſpecting the ſubject he had written upon. Sir H. Clinton ſailed for Europe; and he has been informed ſince, that ſoon after the Court Martial had adjourned from day to day, and finally *fine die*; and that General Waſhington on this ordered the army of the York Town Convention to draw lots, which fell upon Captain Aſgill of the Guards; that the Court Martial did re-aſſemble. It is preſumed, that ſoon after this General Waſhington may have diſcovered that he had acted rather *raſhly*, in ſeizing upon a priſoner under *formal Convention, and in which the French nation was included as a party*; he therefore

fore did all he could to induce Captain Aſgill to eſcape. Captain Aſgill, without the leaſt ſuſpicion of their motive, very honourably diſdained to make uſe of the opportunities which preſented themſelves. Information, it is ſaid, was repeatedly ſent to Sir Guy Carleton, who probably ſaw it exactly as above ſtated, and judged that General Waſhington did not dare, for the above reaſons, execute his threats. The Court Martial continued ſitting, and proceeded to the following ſentence: "That although Joſhua Huddy was "executed without proper authority, what the priſoner did in the matter was "not the effect of malice or ill-will, but proceeded from a conviction, that "it was his duty to obey the orders of the Board of Directors of Aſſociated "Loyaliſts; and his not doubting their having full authority to give ſuch "orders, they acquit him."

General Waſhington and Congreſs ſeeing that Captain Aſgill would not eſcape, it is preſumed, contrived to have it hinted to Captain Aſgill's friends here, that they would do well to apply through the Court of France; they did ſo; and, it is ſaid, the Queen of France aſked as a favour of Congreſs and General Waſhington, what was certainly doing both a great favour, inaſmuch as it relieved them from an aukward ſituation in which they had precipitately and inconſiderately plunged themſelves. There is no doubt, if Captain Aſgill had eſcaped, that Captain Schanks of the 57th regiment, a priſoner of war, or ſome other priſoner of war, would have been executed.

Page 429, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman ſeems to imply, that "Sir H. Clinton had "been ſuperſeded in the command by Sir Guy Carleton."

Sir H. Clinton ſhall cloſe theſe Obſervations with a few letters received from His Majeſty's Miniſters at different periods of his command in America, as proofs, that from the moment he firſt received His Majeſty's orders to take that command, to the hour His Majeſty was graciouſly pleaſed to permit him to reſign to Sir Guy Carleton, he had the ſatisfaction to receive His Majeſty's approbation of his conduct.

Sir H. Clinton was, by His Majeſty's orders, to take the command of his armies in North America in 1778, on Sir William Howe having obtained His Majeſty's permiſſion to reſign; but after 14,000 men, inſtead of being added to the army, (which Sir H. Clinton had every reaſon to expect) had been taken from it—finding, on the contrary, that the enemy oppoſed to him had increaſed in numbers; that many French officers had entered into it; that it had been reinforced by a French army, and its operations occaſionally ſupported by a French fleet much ſuperior to the Britiſh—that, although reduced in a great meaſure to a war of expedition, the Admiral, appointed as his colleague, thought and acted, in almoſt every inſtance, different from Sir H. Clinton—finding, under all theſe circumſtances, he could no longer have hopes of acting with advantage to his country, and honour and credit to himſelf, Sir Henry moſt humbly requeſted His Majeſty's permiſſion to reſign the command of the army to Lord Cornwallis, as the next officer in rank to him. The following is the anſwer Sir H. Clinton received to his ſolicitation, dated November 4, 1779.

Extract of Lord GEORGE GERMAINE'S *letter to Sir* H. CLINTON, *November* 4, 1779.

" I did not omit the earlieſt opportunity of laying before his Majeſty your " letter of 20th Auguſt, in which you expreſs your deſire of being permitted " to return to England, and reſign the command of the troops to Lord Corn- " wallis. Though the King has great confidence in Lord Cornwallis's abili- " ties, yet his Majeſty is too well ſatisfied with your conduct to wiſh to ſee " the command of his army in other hands. You have had too recent proofs " of his Majeſty's favour to doubt of his Royal Approbation. Though your " army is much diminiſhed, yet you have ſhewn, that activity and good con- " duct can enſure ſucceſs; and, I muſt add, that Generals gain at leaſt as

" much honour by their able management of ſmall armies, as where they act " with a ſuperiority which commands ſucceſs."

This letter Sir H. Clinton received while engaged in the ſiege of Charles Town in April, 1780; at the ſucceſsful concluſion of which, Sir Henry received moſt ample teſtimony of his Sovereign's approbation: but having ſtill ſtronger reaſon to induce him to wiſh to reſign the command, he perſiſted in his humble requeſt, particularly when he found *his* plan of operations for the campaign of 1781, which he had flattered himſelf had been approved, was *now* ſuſpended, and a preference given to one offered by a ſubordinate General, made without the means of general information, which Sir H. Clinton was ordered to adopt and ſupport. Sir H. Clinton, who, from the particular ſituation of the army at the time, could not reſign, had he even obtained his Majeſty's permiſſion, after making his ſtrongeſt remonſtrances, and pointing out the danger of the plan he was ordered to adopt, obeyed, re-inforced, ſupported, aſſiſted operation to his utmoſt; and when (as he had predicted it would) the army under Lord Cornwallis was dangerouſly engaged, Sir H. Clinton embarked on board an inferior fleet of twenty-five ſail of the line to force his way through thirty-ſeven of the enemy, and attempt a junction with Lord Cornwallis, determining, however, if he had ſucceeded, to reſign the command to his Lordſhip. At the inſtant Sir H. Clinton had embarked, and was proceeding to attempt a junction with Lord Cornwallis, he received the following letter from Lord George Germaine, dated July 7, 1781:

" The uneaſineſs you expreſs about Admiral Arbuthnot's continuing in the " command of the fleet, muſt have ceaſed long before *this* reaches you, as " Admiral Digby is appointed to command his Majeſty's ſhips in North " America, in the room of Admiral Arbuthnot, ſo that I conclude he will " have left the command ſome time before Mr. Digby arrives, and, I truſt, in " full time to prevent your reſigning the command to Earl Cornwallis."

Extract

Extract of a Letter from Lord G. GERMAINE, *July* 14, 1781.

"I loſt no time in laying before His Majeſty your letter, No. 130, and "that of the 9th June; and it is with unfeigned pleaſure I obey his Majeſty's "commands in expreſſing to you his Royal Approbation of the plan you have "adopted for proſecuting the war on the ſouth of Delawar, and of the ſuc- "cours you have furniſhed and inſtructions you have given for carrying it "into execution. I cannot cloſe this letter without repeating to you the very "great ſatisfaction your diſpatch has given me, and my moſt entire coincidence "with you in the plan you have propoſed to Lord Cornwallis for diſtreſſing "the Rebels, and recovering the Southern Provinces to the King's obedience; "and as his Lordſhip, when he receives your letters of the 8th and 11th of "June, will have fully ſeen the reaſonableneſs of it, I have not the leaſt "doubt but his Lordſhip has executed it."

It will have been ſeen that Lord Cornwallis had not thought or acted as the Miniſter expected. If the cataſtrophe of York Town was completed before Sir H. Clinton arrived off Cheſapeak Bay, if there were any delays in the equipment or ſailing of the fleet, if Lord Cornwallis did not defend this exterior poſition, or the interior, ſo long as Sir H. Clinton had reaſon from his Lordſhip's accounts to expect he would, none of them can be imputed ſurely to Sir H. Clinton or the army. The troops were actually embarked a fortnight before the fleet was ready to ſail. On reading Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 20th October, after his capitulation, the expreſſions before alluded to, had ſtruck Sir H. Clinton; but out of delicacy he had ſent that letter to England without any comment, waiting till he ſhould have ſeen Lord Cornwallis. In a converſation he had with Lord Cornwallis, on his arrival at New York, Sir H. Clinton mentioned all the objectionable parts of that letter, and among other

other things that his Lordſhip had aſſerted, Sir Henry had *given aſſurances* of the exertions of the navy to attempt to ſuccour his Lordſhip before the 24th September, which his Lordſhip had received the 29th; Lord Cornwallis acknowledged "if he had ſaid ſo, he had ſaid what was wrong." Sir Henry mentioned ſome other particulars, and Lord Cornwallis ſeemed either tacitly or formally to acknowledge Sir H. Clinton was right.

Sir H. Clinton finds it neceſſary to mention another proof of his Majeſty's approbation of his conduct. Whether the ſevere cenſures paſſed upon Lord Cornwallis's 10th article of his capitulation of York Town, were merited or not, Sir H. Clinton ſhall not now enter into; the effect it had upon the whole body of Loyaliſts on the continent of America, was alarming indeed; and the impreſſion it had made on his Majeſty and his Miniſters, is ſufficiently ſhewn by the following extract of a letter from Lord George Germaine, dated December 6, 1781:

"It gave his Majeſty great concern to find, by the copies of the articles of "Lord Cornwallis's capitulation and correſpondence with General Waſhing-"ton incloſed in your No. 146, that the alarm taken by the King's loyal ſub-"jects, who have borne arms in ſupport of the Conſtitution, upon the "rumours of the 10th article, *was not without cauſe*; but it gave great ſatis-"faction to his Majeſty to find, by the report I made him of your Aid-de-"camp's converſation with me, that you had intended to take the moſt likely "means of quieting their apprehenſions, and reſtoring their confidence, by "giving out in public orders the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that no poſt, place, or "garriſon, ſhould be ſurrendered on any terms which might diſcriminate be-"tween them, or put one on a worſe footing than the other; and his Ma-"jeſty commanded me to expreſs to you his approbation of thoſe orders, and "to ſignify to you his Royal Pleaſure, that you, in his Majeſty's name, give "the Loyal Refugees the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, &c. &c."

Thus, from the inſtant Sir H. Clinton was ordered to take the command of the army, to the moment he obtained his Majeſty's permiſſion to reſign it, he flatters himſelf he produces indiſputable proofs of his Majeſty's fulleſt approbation of his conduct.

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